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Abstract 
While concerned with how man achieves his status as a moral being, Friedrich 
Schiller develops a concept of play that serves as a bridge between our sensuous
existence to the rational, realizing moral freedom. In what ways might we extend 
this concept to the non-human animal? Current research by play theorists and 
ethologists has shown that play behaviour in animals is both complex and crucial in
determining social patterns, and Schiller’s account may have anticipated these 
observations. I argue that through Schiller’s theory of play and our current research
on animal play, it is possible to undermine the systematic removal of the animal 
from the moral realm that happens in modern philosophy. Through play theory, 
there is a possible way to undermine the assumption that animals are incapable of
achieving the status of moral agents, providing an alternate route to the standard 
view of animals as moral patients. 
Introduction 
In Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, he 
states “man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a 
human being, and he is only fully a human being when he 
plays” (Schiller 1968, 107). While concerned as to how man achieves 
his status as a moral being, Schiller develops a concept of play that is 
to serve as a bridge between our sensuous existence to the rational.  It
is in this realm of play that we realize our moral freedom.  In what 
ways might we extend this concept into the realm of the non-human 
animal? It has often been assumed, especially in the Eighteenth- and 
Nineteenth-Century, that the mechanisms by which we achieve 
morality would be exclusively human.  For example, Kant argues in 
Critique of Practical Reason that rational beings cannot determine 
their will in a maxim based in the maxim’s content, but rather in the 
form, thus excluding our sensuous existence in the phenomenal 
world that is often associated with our animal bodies.  If such 
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determinations occur, such acts have no moral worth (Kant 2007).  
Current research by play theorists and ethologists have shown that 
play behaviour in animals is both very complex and very crucial in 
determining social patterns, and thus Schiller’s account of moral 
agency may have anticipated these current observations in biology 
and psychology. In this paper, I argue that through Schiller’s theory 
of play and our current research on animal play, it is possible to 
undermine the systematic removal of the animal from the moral 
realm that takes place in “modern” philosophical systems.  First, I 
discuss more in detail Schiller’s development of play as a means to 
achieve morality before moving to contemporary research regarding 
animal play.  Then I discuss how this will be a possible way to 
undermine the assumption that animals are incapable of achieving 
the status of moral agents, leaving it open as to whether our current 
stance on animals and morality implicitly condemns them to a lower 
rank and dismisses the interests that they can generate on their own. 
Schiller's Account of Play and Morality 
In Schiller’s discussion of play, what emerges is that man is 
unable to achieve freedom as long as he is divided between his animal
and rational nature. As the contemporary thinker Giorgio Agamben 
points out in The Open, our human history has been built upon the 
quest of finding the characteristic or quality that separates man from 
the animal, an operation which he coins as the “Anthropological 
Machine”. Through critical analysis, these “distinctively human” 
qualities often dissolve into being arbitrarily identified, and only 
maintain themselves by selectively ignoring problem cases.  By 
Schiller’s time, language was considered to be the component that
could carry out this separation (Agamben 2004), which linking to 
logos, we can see connects back to our rational capabilities. 
Schiller adopts this divide by identifying two seemingly opposing 
drives: the sensuous drive and the formal drive.  The sensuous drive 
is what is derived from our physical existence, that part of us that is 
aware of only the moment and represents our animal side.  The 
sensuous drive is considered to be passive in that it is to be open to 
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receiving matter, which is content that changes, from nature.  The 
formal drive “proceeds from the absolute existence of man, or from 
his rational nature” (Schiller 1968, 81), where man exists as eternal 
and is held together by the laws provided actively by form.  At first, it 
appears that these drives are diametrically opposed to each other in 
that they both demand that the individual follow its directive.  The 
sensuous drive provides content and demands change while the
formal drive provides laws and demands consistency through rules.  
Yet if one drive is stronger than the other, we arrive at a dysfunctional
individual. When the sensuous drive is stronger, man is well versed 
in his material existence, but is also naïve and capricious because he 
is more so momentary and blind to potentials in his perception of the 
world that would direct his behaviour towards future projects.  When 
the formal drive is dominant, we arrive at the barbaric individual who
either is lethargic, and does not interact with his environment, or is 
myopic, and attempts to force his laws upon a reality that is not 
willing to conform. In that state of imbalance, man is unable to 
achieve moral freedom because there is a need for the function of 
both drives in order to carry out moral action. We need moral laws to
direct our will and behaviours, since the self is a product of a 
coherent narrative of moments in time.  Yet we also need concrete 
situations in order to display that will; otherwise all appeals to a self 
composed of actions will merely be an imaginary one.  Thus, while 
one is imbalanced between these two drives, the individual is just 
driven blindly by physical impulses or remains an empty person who 
never realizes itself in the material world. 
It is at this point that Schiller introduces the play drive, the third 
drive that operates over the first two to bring about harmony.  
Although the drives appear to oppose each other, Schiller points out 
that they are actually dependent upon each other to operate, since 
matter needs consistency in the background in order to be 
perceivable as change, while form needs content to make it 
efficacious. Therefore, play brings about this harmony of the drives 
by suspending their necessity to be dominant, while preserving the 
necessity of their function. Both are in a sense taken seriously, as one
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tends to do in one’s own play activities, but neither is taken so
seriously that they take over the activity.  It is within this realm that 
beauty is realized (Schiller 1968). 
The concept of aesthetic semblance is then later developed in the
Twenty-Sixth Letter in order to give more depth and detail to this 
operation of play. What is characteristic of aesthetic semblance is 
that we approach our phenomenal existence with a degree of 
seriousness, but at the same time not so serious that we insist on a 
deeper truth to that phenomenon (as the play drive approaches the 
sensuous drive and formal drive).  We take delight in semblance and 
we remain open to what it presents, but we also are able to interact 
with it based on the possibilities that particular semblance presents. 
Although some may interpret this as a form of relativism or proto­
phenomenology, which this paper does not need to address here 
given the topic, the important aspect of this concept is that it insists 
on an openness to one’s condition without demanding a radical 
justification of it. Those who approach semblance by applying some 
theodicy or theoretical abstraction to provide justification for the 
current condition are guilty of what Schiller calls “logical semblance”,
which deviates from play and falls into deception due to its insistence
of consistency and form that does not take content and matter into 
account. Such accounts of experience move away from what is 
presented, and thus lose all chances of explaining reality based on the
fact that it has pushed out what is to be explained.  Yet when form 
and matter are approached together without a necessity of either, 
play allows us to act and find meaning in that act.  It is this way of 
using both the sensuous and formal drives that we achieve moral 
freedom, where we carry out the moral law in a concrete situation, 
which in turn gives an actual meaning to the law being followed (as 
opposed to a formal law that is stated but never acted upon). 
The question that arises from looking at Schiller’s account of 
moral agency is whether or not we could apply this theory to 
animals.  It could be said that Schiller is not directly interested in 
whether or not animals can be moral agents.  However, the sensuous 
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drive gets associated with “the animal” and “nature” in his scheme, 
indicating that Schiller indirectly assumes that animals lack the 
formal unity that humans have. As Schiller breaks it down in the
Eleventh Letter, our experience of time as humans is quite 
complicated because our experience of time is a combination of 
“Person” and “Condition”, that which endures and that which 
changes. Our person is what we consider to be the self, that which 
links together our experiences into something that is unchanging and 
is indifferent to what occurs outside of it, thus being grounded in 
absolute freedom. Our condition is the circumstance that determines
who we are as a concrete individual, and even though he refers to the 
condition as a monolithic category, it is actually a massive collection 
of particular contents from the sensuous drive that are never actually 
linked together cognitively except through the form of personhood.   
Nevertheless, transcendentally, all conditions are grounded in the 
larger condition of Time, the “’condition of all becoming’” (Schiller 
1968, 75). This says nothing other than “the sequence is the 
condition that something happens” (“die Folge ist die Bedingung, 
dass etwas erfolgt” (Schiller 1968, 74: My translation from the 
German), removing all necessity that is determined by the formal 
drive that allows cognition and semblance.  Therefore, without the 
formal drive, which is the necessary component for experiencing 
ourselves as free persons in time, we also lose cognition of time as a 
connected sequence of events, even though there is a sequence there. 
This would mean that an animal’s sense of time is only momentary, 
while current research in animal behaviour proves that this is not the 
case, given that they do demonstrate memory of events that have 
occurred in the past. 
Thus, given that Schiller attempts to open up a new realm with
aesthetics and play that negotiates between our momentary and
eternal existence, there is little argumentation that can prove that 
Schiller’s system would become inconsistent or anthropomorphic if 
we were to apply it to non-human animals. What I would like to take 
from Schiller’s account is that play is a necessary component to how 
we realize moral freedom and become moral persons, since the realm 
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of play and the aesthetic is where we can negotiate between the 
abstract principles that hold a person together with the constant 
becoming that we are confronted with at the moment.  Although 
there are a number of play theorists who are not at all interested in 
establishing morality through play, even in humans, Schiller is one 
notable thinker who tries to establish a systematic connection 
between these two concepts.  If Schiller is correct in asserting that 
play is how we ultimately achieve moral freedom, then the discovery 
of play in animals alongside with this theory could serve to 
undermine our modernist assumption that animals are incapable of 
being moral agents. 
Play Theory and Contemporary Animal Studies 
In contemporary play theory and animal studies, theorists and 
researchers have discussed three qualities of play that would, I argue, 
help establish a moral order among animals, including humans: 1) 
play introduces the “negative” that could be an early formation of 
normative thinking, 2) it conditions the social behaviour of animals 
when they reach adulthood, and 3) it is a behaviour that requires the 
negotiation with others on rules to follow and what is just.  We need 
to explore these qualities in more detail. 
In The Ambiguity of Play, Brian Sutton-Smith discusses the 
theoretical background of animal play, and indicates that play does 
provide a pre-linguistic form of the negative.  What we mean here by 
“the negative” is the awareness of something absent or lacking, thus 
comparing the experience to an ideal, possibility, or other moment.  
Normally, we associate the negative as a function of language because 
we can indicate the absence of something or point out what we are 
not doing through speech or writing.  I can say, “This circle is 
imperfect because not every point is the same distance from the 
centre point” and mean something due to the linguistic definition we 
assign to circle and the object’s deficiency to fit that expected 
definition. Yet play is a specific behaviour that emphasizes what is 
not being done, where the act of fighting is not really fighting or a nip 
is carried out instead of a serious bite. “It says no by saying 
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yes” (Sutton-Smith 2001, 22) in that the aggressiveness of certain 
behaviours become suspended, allowing for the action to be practiced
itself without serious consequences that would normally follow. 
As Sutton-Smith argues, this reveals a much more complex 
cognitive process than psychologists and philosophers have 
previously attributed to play, since negation, the awareness of
absence and what is not the case, reveals a sense of reflection in 
animals that cannot be interpreted as instinctive and discontinuous.  
Both temporally and cognitively, the animal is able to indicate 
something that is above the experience itself, thus undermining the 
assumption that animals live only a momentary existence.  Given that
play itself is a very ambiguous behaviour, it does at least open up the 
possibility for normative thinking, since normative thinking focuses 
on what should be, yet is not always, the case.  Although we often 
have a difficult time explaining “normative force” or justification for 
following a certain normative system, normativity itself is the 
formation of expectations outside given experience, to expect 
something else to occur in reality outside its description.  Activities 
such as play fighting indicate such forms of thinking, where a 
narrative is placed over the actual set of events, no longer describing 
them but rather indicating what one’s real actions are to signify in a 
fictional framework. 
Robert Fagen, on the other hand, uses current research in 
ethology and play theory to reveal a strong correlation between play 
behaviour and social behaviour in his essay “Animal Play, Games of 
Angels, Biology, and Brian”. Usually, sporadic play behaviour that we
associate with child animals tends to cease in adult animals, but 
Fagen argues that play behaviour still exists in adult animals through 
their social bonding functions.  Specifically, there are two contexts: 1) 
parents still play with their children and 2) adults also tend to play 
with their mates through affection.  Thus, although this play 
behaviour is more isolated and controlled, it still serves the function 
of bringing individuals together.  For example, it has been observed 
that adult lowland gorillas have a similar process of selecting social 
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partners as they did when they selected their play partners as 
juveniles, and so one can often predict the social patterns of a group 
based on their interactions as children (Fagan 1995). However, there 
also seems to be a strong correlation between play and how animals 
respond to stimuli: “Rats that play less are inept at judging when to 
feel threatened by a situation and at judging when a situation does 
not call for defensive actions. Defensive behavior of rats with little or 
no play experience is seldom appropriate to the situation” (Fagan 
1995, 35). Rats who did not play as much while in infancy tended to 
either overreact or failed to respond to stimuli, and this translated 
into how they would treat other rats when placed in the same cage.  
In an extensive study conducted by Michael Potegal and Dorothy
Einon between play histories and adult rate behaviour, rats that were 
socialized through organized playfighting, were less likely to engage 
in shock-induced fighting than rats who were isolated during 
development or socialized in pairs. Rats who were isolated and never
played with other rats tended to overreact by attacking its partner rat,
thus misidentifying the source of the shock.  Rats who were socialized
through daily playfighting were also more likely to carry mice placed 
in its cage, as opposed to killing it, which the latter behaviour seemed 
to be less affected by the three possible conditions of rearing (Potegal
and Einon 1989). In addition, some rats that lacked a traceable play 
history would develop an aggressive personality, and would bully 
other rats, while others developed a more submissive personality and 
would allow themselves to be bullied without much resistance (Fagen
1995). From this, we can certainly see that play does have some effect
upon our actions and our judgment of both personal and social 
situations, which is a central component of moral freedom. 
In “Wild Justice and Fair Play: Cooperation, Forgiveness, and 
Morality in Animals”, Marc Bekoff highlights how play is an 
important realm of moral development due to the necessary 
construction and flexible application of rules that takes place between
animals during play behaviour.  He states that: “Incorporated into 
many explanations of social play are such notions as making a deal, 
trusting, behaving fairly, forgiving, apologizing, and perhaps justice, 
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behavioural attributes that underlie social morality and moral 
agency” (Bekoff 2007, 78). In order to avoid one’s actions from being 
misinterpreted as aggressive, it is necessary that animals establish 
customs and rules that help signal when play is taking place.  Dogs, 
for example, engage in a series of bows that signal the desire to play 
and, subsequently, the acceptance of the invitation to play.  
Otherwise, the intention to play could degenerate into a disastrous 
fight, but Bekoff points out that such confrontational developments
are rare.  Animals also display a great deal of flexibility about rules, as
indicated by their ability to forgive certain breaches of rules or 
miscommunications. When an animal is not necessarily well versed 
in the rules of the group, more experience players will correct the 
inexperience ones, while refraining from shunning them from the 
game. Yet this exercise of forgiveness does not mean that the rules 
are not taken seriously. Case studies have shown, such as with dogs, 
that animals will ostracize continual cheaters and will not even 
engage with them in play once it becomes clear that the cheater is 
intentionally violating the rules of the game to “win”.  Therefore, 
these animals consider the game to be quite serious in the end, and 
will not allow constant rule breaking to dissolve their play activities. 
This idea of fairness and cooperation then stretches out beyond 
the play sphere and is applied to social contexts.  For example, Bekoff
points out that wolves form packs based on playmates, even though 
earlier researchers thought that the formation of packs depended 
more on food-related factors.  Wolves who did not play with others 
tend to be alone as adults and could at times be viciously attacked if 
they attempted to go into a pack’s territory (Bekoff 2007).  Stuart 
Brown points out also that wolves neurologically become set in their 
social behaviours once they develop past adolescence, and therefore 
the neural plasticity present in their younger years, in which they 
engage in play quite frequently, ceases.  At the adult stage, wolves 
become more concerned with status within the pack and the territory
of the pack, the boundaries and dynamics of which are established in 
their earlier years of play. Dogs, on the other hand, often remain in 
this stage of adolescence where their neural structures remain plastic,
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and therefore are more capable of learning and modifying 
behaviours. A similar trend can be seen between chimpanzees and 
humans, where chimpanzees cease being playful in their adult stage 
and become rigid in their behaviour, whereas humans remain 
physiologically in a “youthful stage” for most of their life (Brown 
2009). 
Moral Agents vs. Moral Patients 
Some may wonder what would be the value of establishing 
animals as moral agents, given that some philosophers have already 
established a moral value for animals by categorizing them as moral 
patients. However, I take issue with this manner of bestowing moral 
worth to non-human animals. Tom Regan is one prominent 
philosopher who articulates this distinction between moral agents 
and moral patients. Moral agents are those who have a “variety of 
sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring 
impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all 
considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this 
determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as 
they conceive it, requires” (Regan 1983, 151).  Therefore, they are 
much more active when considering morality, and we hold moral 
agents responsible for their actions because we see them as directing 
their own behaviour. More specifically, we see moral agents as 
possessing some quality that makes them capable of engaging with 
moral systems.  We also acknowledge them as equals, and there is a 
demand of reciprocity that goes along with the respect amongst 
moral agents.  Moral patients, on the other hand, “lack the 
prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behaviour 
in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they 
do” (Regan 1983, 152). Animals are often classified as moral patients,
and thus cannot have their actions be evaluated in terms of being 
morally wrong or right, yet we still say that they deserve to be morally
considered when we act towards them. 
Although one can appreciate Regan’s attempt to incorporate 
animals into the moral realm, this concept of moral patient 
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establishes an extremely passive role, and it reveals the modern bias 
that relegates animals to the sensuous realm.  In designating them as
moral patients, we imply that they are incapable of engaging in any 
moral system whatsoever, and their interests thus become visible 
only through our own moral system.  Animals are seen as not 
directing their own behaviour, yet the research above does show that 
they are in fact capable of regulating their own actions and social 
interactions (and perhaps better than humans, given some case 
studies). In The Case for Animals Rights, Regan tries to take the 
animal’s interest into consideration based on the principle that 
interest is the very thing that directs our behaviours, yet it seems 
problematic if we were to take an animal’s interest seriously but not 
its actions. Thus, the danger of Regan’s system, as well as any other 
who classify non-human animals as moral patients, is that they 
become highly anthropocentric. The value that we can derive for 
animals do not really generate from their own interests, even though
we may be able to recognize them as having such, but rather their 
value is generated through the structure and content of our own 
moral system.  This completely ignores the fact that animals do 
construct their own social behaviours based on their own norms 
rather than ours, which their play behaviour demonstrates.  If we fail 
to acknowledge these moral systems that are constructed, and thus 
fail to see animals as moral agents within their own horizon of 
interests, we will never be able to really take into account the animal 
in any real moral light. In failing to embrace the alterity of the non­
human animals on its own terms, we fail to establish any substantial 
moral worth them. 
Conclusions 
Although these points derived from current research on animals 
does not conclusively show us that animals do have a specific moral 
system, or even how we can interact with that moral system to see 
them as moral agents, it does open up questions that undermine the 
early modern assumption that it is simply out of the question that 
animals could be moral agents. As Schiller’s account suggests, if we 
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realize our status as moral agents through play, then the observation 
that other animals play points to the possibility that moral agency is
not an exclusively human way of living.  In fact, as we begin to take 
non-human animals more seriously, we see unfolding a complex 
structure of social and personal relationships that are not ruled by 
instinct. As Fagen points out in his essay, evolutionary biologists 
have started researching how aesthetics may have contributed to the 
biodiversity we see today, and they suddenly have made great 
progress in explaining certain puzzling parts of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution (Fagen 1995). Thus, with further research, we may find out
that seeing animals as moral agents is not so ridiculous after all, and 
it is in fact incredulous to think that non-human animal behaviour 
should lack the coherency that we see behind our actions.
Establishing animals as moral agents, entities that can establish and 
govern themselves by rules, both calls into question how we 
categorize animals and where we place ourselves in relation to the 
“moral realm”. If we are to interact seriously with animals, we need 
to cease placing ourselves in completely different realms of existence, 
and acknowledge that both man and the animal exist somewhere 
between the moment and the eternal. 
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